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The conflicts over sex allocation and male production in insect societies have
long served as an important test bed for Hamilton’s theory of inclusive fit-
ness, but have for the most part been considered separately. Here, we
develop new coevolutionary models to examine the interaction between
these two conflicts and demonstrate that sex ratio and colony productivity
costs of worker reproduction can lead to vastly different outcomes even
in species that show no variation in their relatedness structure. Empirical
data on worker-produced males in eight species of Melipona bees support
the predictions from a model that takes into account the demographic details
of colony growth and reproduction. Overall, these models contribute signifi-
cantly to explaining behavioural variation that previous theories could not
account for.1. Introduction
When discussing the evolution of social insects, Hamilton [1] emphasized var-
ious reproductive conflicts among colony members, mentioning that ‘the queen
may be inclined to produce more males than the sterile workers regard as ideal.
On the other hand a laying worker may want more males than the queen
does—provided the extra males are her own (the worker’s) offspring Q’. These
insights soon led to mathematical theories of conflicts over sex allocation and
male production [2,3]. Most models, however, have considered different kin
conflicts separately, which sometimes leads to contradictory predictions. For
example, in colonies headed by a single once-mated queen, the workers have
been suggested to prefer both female-biased sex ratios and male production
by highly related sister workers [2,3]. Worker reproduction also interacts with
split sex ratios when the relatedness structure varies among colonies [4].
Hence, it is important to handle the simultaneous interaction of different
types of kin conflicts [5–7].
Here, we will revisit the question outlined by Hamilton and develop coevo-
lutionary models [8] to analyse the simultaneous selection for worker
reproduction and policing (inhibition of worker reproduction by other workers
[9]) and sex allocation biasing. Previously, one model investigated how effects
on the sex ratio can alter selection for worker policing, albeit without explicit
consideration of worker reproduction [6]. In our models, worker reproduction
affects both the colony’s sex ratio and its productivity (since worker-produced
males can replace female workers). In the light of these models, we interpret
































































ARTICLE IN PRESSthe amount of worker reproduction despite displaying
minimal variation in kin structure [9].sbl.royalsocietypublishing.org
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201303342. Models
Our models are for male-haploid social insect colonies
headed by a single queen. Under random mating, the genetic
relatedness (r) among worker nest-mates ranges from 0.75
(monandry) to 0.25 (extreme polyandry). The genetic value
of each individual is determined by the product of genetic
relatedness, reproductive value (v) and mating success [2].
The mating success is given as an inverse of the number of
a given sex that is produced in the population (1/F for
females and 1/M for males). The models further assume
weak selection (gradual evolution) and focus on the invasion
of worker reproduction and worker policing in a situation
where there can be simultaneous selection on the proportion
of female eggs f laid by the queen and the amount of worker
sex allocation biasing K.
We distinguish two main models (see the electronic sup-
plementary material). In Model 1, the workers do not directly
manipulate the sex ratio of the queen’s offspring but instead
replace some of the existing eggs with their own eggs. The
basic model (Model 1a) reflects the life cycle of some ant
species, such as slave-making ants, where little or no
worker sex allocation biasing occurs [5], and where the
sexual brood develops as a separate cohort. We then
assume that worker-laid eggs replace random male- and
gyne-destined eggs with probability w, without altering the
total productivity of the colony. Worker reproduction in
this situation can result in a suboptimal sex ratio but cannot
come at a cost to worker production or colony productivity
[7]. Model 1b is tailored to the life cycle of swarm-founding
bees, and assumes that, in addition to sexual eggs, workers
also randomly replace worker-destined queen-laid eggs. In
this case, worker reproduction reduces colony productivity
(male and daughter swarm production), with the cost
depending on the rate with which workers provision new
cells (b), worker mortality (m) and the fraction of females
that develop into queens (q). We solved Model 1b using
both inclusive fitness and traditional population genetic
approaches (see the electronic supplementary material),
with identical results. Subsequently, the theoretical pre-
dictions were compared with data from eight species of
Melipona bees [10] (see the electronic supplementary mate-
rial). For both submodels, we determine the conditions
under which worker reproduction can invade the popula-
tion and determine the evolutionarily stable (ESS) level of
worker reproduction when the proportion of female eggs
laid by the queen f either can or cannot coevolve with the
amount of worker reproduction. In addition, we determine
the conditions under which worker policing is expected
to invade, i.e. when collective worker interests disfavour
worker reproduction [11].
Model 2 then takes into account active sex ratio manipu-
lation by the workers and thus reflects the life cycle of many
ants such as Formica. Queens lay gyne- and male-destined
eggs in a separate cohort in proportions f and 1 – f. Workers
can distinguish the sex of young larvae, and kill a fraction K
of the brothers to transfer the resources with efficiency E to
more highly related sisters. The worker-laid eggs face the
same destiny as the other male eggs in the nest. As inrsbl20130334—30/9/13—19:45–Copy Edited by: Mahalakshmi S.Model 1a, we then examine the conditions under which
worker reproduction and worker policing is able to invade
the population.3. Results
(a) Model 1: workers randomly replace queen-laid eggs









which reduces to f . (4rsister 2 1)/(4rsister þ 1) given that
f ¼ F/(F þM), vf/vm ¼ 2 (table 1). This shows that workers
benefit from laying eggs when the sex ratio is female-biased
and in polyandrous colonies also when the sex ratio is
male-biased (figure 1a).
When worker reproduction is rare (i.e. w  0), the other
workers should police their fellow workers and prevent








which reduces to f , (2rsister þ 1)/(4rsister þ 1) (table 1). This
condition shows that under single mating (rsister ¼ 3/4),
worker policing is selected for as long as the queen lays
less than 5/8 ¼ 63% female eggs (figure 1a, blue area).
Under multiple mating, conditions become even more
relaxed (figure 1a).
When worker reproduction spreads, the sex-specific
reproductive values change and their ratio becomes
vf/vm ¼ 22 c , where the proportion of males that are
workers’ sons is c ¼ w/[w þ (12 w)(1 2 f )] [2]. The pre-
dicted level of worker reproduction favoured by collective
worker interests can then be solved by assuming that the gen-
etic value of a new nephew equals that of a random existing
offspring (table 1). For monandrous colonies, the predicted
proportion of males that will be workers’ sons, assuming that
many workers would reproduce within a colony (resulting in
a relatedness to worker-produced males of rwm ¼ rsister), is
c ¼ (8f 2 5)/(5f2 2) (figure 2, blue curve and table 1),
which will result in a numerical investment in males of
M ¼ (5f2 2)/(8f 2 2). For example, if the queen lays 25%
male eggs (12 f ¼ 0.25), workers are predicted to produce
about a quarter of all eggs and 57% of all the males, thereby
raising the fraction of males in the population to M ¼ 44%.
Furthermore, if the proportion of female eggs laid by the
queen is allowed to coevolve, a bistable outcome is pre-
dicted in which either high or low worker reproduction
with an approximately equal numerical investment sex ratio
are both alternative stable outcomes (table 1 and electro-
nic supplementary material, figure S4). These predictions
are consistent with available data from several species of
slave-making ants.
Invasion conditions for worker reproduction and worker
policing under Model 1b for swarming colonies (table 1 and
figure 1b) are derived analogously to equations (3.1)
and (3.2). Owing to nonlinear effects of worker reproduction
on colony productivity, however, the response of small
changes in worker reproduction on the costs and benefits to
the different classes of relatives are calculated using partial
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Model 1a
Model 2, E = 0.3 Model 2, E = 0.5
Model 2, E = 0.9999Model 2, E = 0.8























































































Figure 1. Areas of parameter space (defined by the proportion of the queen’s eggs that are female f and sister– sister relatedness r) which allow invasion of worker
reproduction and policing in a population where worker reproduction is initially absent (c  0) (cf. table 1). The results are shown for (a) Model 1a, where colonies
are founded by lone queens and worker-laid eggs randomly compete with male- and gyne-destined queen-laid eggs, (b) Model 1b, where colonies reproduce by
swarming and worker-laid eggs randomly compete with male-, gyne- and worker-destined queen-laid eggs (graph is shown for parameter values appropriate for
Melipona stingless bees: b ¼ 0.044, q ¼ 0.0847, m ¼ 0.024, see electronic supplementary material, tables S2–S4) and (c– f ) Model 2, where the workers
manipulate the sex ratio towards their own optimum via the killing of less related brothers and reinvesting freed-up resources into more related sisters with effi-
ciencies E ¼ 0.3, 0.5, 0.8 and 1. The areas in the parameter space are green: no worker reproduction, blue: worker reproduction selected for, but potentially
inhibited by worker policing, red: uninhibited worker reproduction. The optimal proportion of female eggs laid by the queen f is indicated with a dashed yellow line.
In Models 1a and 1b, two alternative equilibria can be reached depending on initial conditions (initial f greater or smaller than the critical value indicated with the



































































ARTICLE IN PRESSWe also calculate the ESS proportion of worker-derived
males as a function of parameters b, f, q and m, which deter-
mine the demographic growth of the colony (table 1). When
worker mortality m approaches 0 and when many workers
would reproduce in the colony (rwm ¼ rsister), both the inva-
sion conditions and the predicted ESS are the same as in
Model 1a (table 1). This is because worker reproduction
then causes a linear tradeoff between male and female invest-
ment (swarm production). In addition, coevolution with the
primary sex ratio produced by the queen predicts a bistablersbl20130334—30/9/13—19:45–Copy Edited by: Mahalakshmi S.outcome in which both high and low levels of worker repro-
duction can be alternative stable states (table 1 and electronic
supplementary material, figure S4).
Predictions based on demographic parameters estimated
from Melipona bees are compared with the observed pro-
portion of males that are workers’ sons, c (figure 2 and
electronic supplementary material, tables S1–S4). As pre-
dicted by our model, species can either have very high or
very low levels of worker reproduction and the observed
values of c increase with the proportion of the queen’s eggs





























proportion of queen’s eggs that are female ( f )
Model 1a
Model 1b
Figure 2. ESS proportions of the males that are workers’ sons (c) predicted
by collective worker interests in colonies headed by a single monandrous
queen (r ¼ 3/4) as a function of the proportion of the queen’s eggs that
are female ( f ) according to (i) Model 1a (blue curves), where colonies
are founded by lone queens and worker-laid eggs randomly compete with
male- and gyne-destined queen-laid eggs and (ii) Model 1b (red curves),
where colonies reproduce by swarming and worker-laid eggs randomly com-
pete with male-, gyne- as well as worker-destined queen-laid eggs, thereby
impacting colony productivity. The curve for Model 1b is drawn for parameter
values appropriate for Melipona stingless bees (b ¼ 0.044, q ¼ 0.0847,
m ¼ 0.024, see electronic supplementary material, tables S2–S4), and
the dots are observed values in eight species of Melipona (see the electronic
supplementary material, table S4). Curves are drawn for the case where
n ¼ 1 (dotted lines), 2 (dashed lines) or 10 (full lines) workers would



































































ARTICLE IN PRESSthat are female ( f ) (figure 2, red curve; based on raw data:
Spearman rank correlation R ¼ 0.90, n ¼ 8, p ¼ 0.002; based
on phylogenetic independent contrasts: Pearson R ¼ 0.92,
p ¼ 0.001, electronic supplementary material, figure S1; for a
sensitivity analysis see electronic supplementary material,
figure S3). This occurs because the colony-level cost of
worker reproduction is smaller when many of the queen’s
eggs are female and destined to become workers. Overall,
the correlation between observed and predicted values of c
(see electronic supplementary material, table S4) is also
highly significant (Pearson R ¼ 0.84, n ¼ 8, p ¼ 0.009).(b) Model 2: workers readjust sex ratio to their
own optimum
In Model 2, workers collectively remove some of the brood
and manipulate sex allocation by moving resources from
less valuable males to more highly related sisters with
efficiency E. Typically, earlier recycling implies a higher effi-
ciency. Selection on the level of killing (K), the primary sex
ratio produced by the queen ( f ) and the amount of worker
reproduction (w) is examined using a similar approach as in
Model 1b [13].
When worker reproduction invades, the worker’s off-
spring will be among the other male brood and treated
with the same rules, as the workers do not distinguish
between worker-derived and queen-derived brood. The con-
ditions for worker reproduction and worker policing to
invade a population where the queen initially lays most
eggs and workers kill male brood with an optimal probability
K* are presented in table 1 and figure 1c–f. When the sex ratio
is close to the worker optimum, worker reproduction does
not invade because of the attached recycling cost. If the sex
ratio departs from the worker optimum, workers are selectedrsbl20130334—30/9/13—19:45–Copy Edited by: Mahalakshmi S.to lay eggs. However, worker policing by other workers also
invades the population, especially if the workers are not very
closely related and the sex ratio is male-biased. If the primary
sex ratio produced by the queen is allowed to coevolve with
the amount of worker sex allocation biasing (see electronic
supplementary material, figure S5), worker policing or even
worker sterility are predicted for low values of E, and the tra-
ditional prediction of worker policing only being favoured
under multiple mating (r , 0.5) is recovered only when E
approaches 1. Nevertheless, an alternative equilibrium in
which worker reproduction is common (c  1) and worker
sex allocation biasing absent is also stable.4. Discussion
Although a large meta-analysis of ca 100 species of ants, bees
and wasps has supported the relatedness hypothesis and the
role of polyandry in selecting for worker policing [9], signifi-
cant unexplained variation in levels of worker reproduction
remains [9,10]. Some of this variation has been attributed to
productivity costs arising, for instance, from reproductive
workers tending to engage less in colony maintenance tasks
[10]. Our models, however, show that such direct efficiency
costs are not required to explain the occurrence of worker
policing or the absence of worker reproduction in monogy-
nous and monandrous species. In fact, we show that this is
well explained by either sex ratio costs or colony producti-
vity costs caused by the replacement of worker-brood by
worker-derived males. Hence, different species with identical
relatedness structure can end up having widely different
amounts of worker reproduction, depending on the specifics
of sex allocation and costs incurred by the brood rearing
dynamics of their colonies. In fact, in Model 2, the traditional
result of worker policing being selected for when queens
are multiple mated (rsister , 0.5) [9] was recovered, but
only when workers can manipulate sex allocation at no cost
(E! 1). When reallocation of resources between the sexes is
costly, policing becomes favourable even under single mating
[9], and if the sex ratio is close to the worker optimum these
costs render worker reproduction unfeasible. In addition, in
Model 1, worker policing can invade under single mating
when worker-laid eggs randomly replace queen-laid eggs.
Qualitatively similar conclusions on the effects of sex allocation
biasing costs were earlier reached by using specific parameter
values [6].
Convincing empirical support for our models is provided
by data on Melipona bees, which show large variation in the
amount of worker reproduction despite displaying hardly
any variation in their kin structure and colonies in most
species being headed by a single once-mated queen [9]. In
particular, data from eight species show that the observed
level of worker reproduction increases with the female bias
among the queen-laid eggs (figure 2). This is in agreement
with our prediction that the colony-level cost of worker
reproduction is relatively smaller when many of the queen’s
eggs are female and destined to become workers.
Overall, our study highlights a clear necessity of simul-
taneously considering several types of kin conflicts in order
to arrive at more realistic predictions based on kin selection
theory. We further show that, despite suggestions to the con-
trary [14,15], detailed assumptions on colony demography

































































ARTICLE IN PRESSmodels, greatly improving the fitness between model predic-
tions and empirical observations. In the future, models in the
social evolution literature would probably benefit from such
detailed treatments.l
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